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Employment relations and social stratification in contemporary urban China: Does 
Goldthorpe’s class theory still work? 
 
Min Zou 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Goldthorpe’s class theory suggests that social class arises from employment relations in 
industrialised societies. This article assesses whether class in urban China can be approached 
from the same perspective by addressing three issues: 1) whether employment relations can 
capture China’s class structure, 2) how differently class is shaped by occupational structure in 
China, and 3) how useful class is to help us understand income inequality. Based on a recent 
Chinese social survey, the analysis finds three clusters of Chinese employees that fit into the 
‘service’, ‘intermediate’ and ‘labour contract’ class typologies suggested by Goldthorpe’s 
class theory. Also, there is evidence that class links to occupational structures in a similar 
way between Chinese and Western societies. Finally class, when directly measured from 
employment relations, displays a reasonable degree of explanatory power for inter-class 
income inequality whereas the Goldthorpe class classification fails to differentiate between 
intermediate and labour class positions. 
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Introduction 
 
Social class in transitional China has received increasing academic attention over the past 
decade. This continued interest has produced a large number of studies on social stratification 
in China (see for example Bian et al., 2005; Lin and Wu, 2009; Wu, 2013; Wu and Treiman, 
2007). Although general consensus is lacking, Goldthorpe’s definition of social class has 
been widely used in class analysis in the Chinese context. According to Goldthorpe (2007), 
social class arises from inequality in production units and reflects similarities in labour 
market situations between individuals.  
    It is not difficult to understand why Goldthorpe’s class theory is popular. As Oesch (2003) 
suggests, this conceptualisation has a clear rationale to distinguish class positions from the 
employment relations perspective and has proven to be very useful in empirical inquiries in 
industralised societies. However, despite its popularity, there are some serious questions that 
need to be addressed before it can be used as a valid concept in the Chinese context. A first, 
and perhaps the most fundamental, question is whether the employment principles, which lay 
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out the theoretical foundations of Goldthorpe’s class theory, are formulated on a similar basis 
between China and Western societies. If not, one might wonder, quite naturally, to what 
extent employment relations still present a valid approach to social class in China. 
    We have good reasons to ask these questions. China, as a transition economy, differs 
significantly in economic institutions and labour market regulations from Western economies. 
In contrast to the capitalistic system characterised by private ownership and free markets, 
China’s reforms have aimed to create a ‘socialist market economy’ in which political power 
persists in economic activities. Moreover, while labour market regulations are well 
established in industrialised countries, China’s legal framework governing work and 
employment relations is still under development. All these suggest labour market dynamics 
may evolve in quite different ways in China compared to the Western world. If this is the 
case, the validity of Goldthorpe’s class theory in the Chinese context will be readily 
challenged and the contributions of previous research re-assessed. 
    Surprisingly, in contrast to the flourishing of research on class in China, very limited effort 
has been made to address these issues in the literature. Researchers seem to have simply 
taken the face value of Goldthorpe’s class theory and used it in the Chinese context without 
seriously investigating into whether the theoretical foundations still hold in the new setting. 
This article aims to bridge this gap by investigating empirically whether class can be 
understood from the employment relations perspective in urban China. Specifically it seeks to 
address three issues. First, can class be defined by employment relations in China? Second, 
how does the way class positions are linked to occupations differ between China and Western 
societies? Finally, how useful is this concept to help us understand income inequality in 
China? Answering these questions will not only shed new light on the generality of this 
influential class theory but also help us achieve a better understanding in the relationship 
between employment relations and social stratification.  
 
 
The conceptualisation of Goldthorpe’s class  
 
The significance of class lies in the fact that it links individuals’ market positions to 
inequality of life chances (Breen, 2005). Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 37) argue that 
classes ‘differentiate positions within labour markets and production units, or, more 
specifically, one could say, to differentiate such positions in terms of the employment 
relations that they entail’. Goldthorpe’s class theory classifies individuals into three 
categories: the employers, the self-employed and employees and suggests that the employee 
category should receive particular attention because this category represents an 
overwhelming proportion of the working population in modern societies and there are 
significant variations in the ways labour is exchanged for market returns within this category.    
    Among employees, a further distinction is placed between those in jobs regulated by a 
labour contract and those by a service contract. The labour contract entails specific, short-
term, exchange relationships between employee and employer regarding how work is 
rewarded. Under this contract, ‘employees supply more-or-less discrete amounts of labour, 
under the supervision of the employer or of the employer’s agents, in return for wages which 
are calculated on a ‘piece’ or ‘time basis’’ (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992: 41). The service 
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contract, in contrast, involves long term and diffuse exchange relationships in which work is 
not only rewarded by wages but also by career advancement opportunities from the employer, 
in return for commitment and loyalty. Under this contract, ‘employees render service to their 
employing organisation in return for ‘compensation’ which takes the form not only of reward 
for work done, through a salary and various perquisites, but also comprises important 
prospective elements – for example, salary increments on an established scale, assurances of 
security both in employment and, through pensions rights, after retirement, and above all, 
well-defined career opportunities.’ (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992: 41-2). In addition to this 
labour-service distinction, there also exists a set of occupations that contain the attributes of 
both contract types which are known as the intermediate classes. A brief description of the 
Goldthorpe class classification1 is shown in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
    The rationale of Goldthorpe’s class theory lies in the way employers motivate employees 
to act in the best interests of the organisation. Goldthorpe (2007: ch. 5) argues that the 
employer-employee dynamics can be understood from two dimensions: 1) difficulty of 
monitoring the work that employees perform and 2) amount of specific skills that employees 
possess. For jobs that are easy to monitor and require low skills, the employment relations are 
regulated by a labour contract as the employees can be rewarded based on their productivity. 
For jobs that are difficult to monitor and require high levels of specific skills, a service 
contract is in place as trust and incentives are required on the part of employee to perform the 
tasks properly. Finally, employment relations arising from jobs with mixed levels on these 
two dimensions will entail a mixed contract. 
    Previous research has shown that Goldthorpe’s class theory works well in identifying 
occupational groups with similar market situations in Western societies. Evans (1992, 1996), 
for example, finds that employment conditions, promotion prospects and work autonomy 
differ significantly between Goldthorpe classes in Britain. Evans and Mills (1998a, 1998b, 
2000) also report that there is a great deal of overlap between Goldthorpe’s classes and the 
employee clusters with similar work conditions. In addition to their British studies, Evans and 
Mills (1999) compare the class positions across Britain, Poland and Hungary and find they 
are very similar between the two former communist countries and Britain. 
Recently, however, the strength of Goldthorpe’s class theory has been under sustained 
attack. One criticism is that Goldthorpe’s approach has overlooked the heterogeneity within 
occupations which leads to concerns about the validity of the employment-based class 
classification in different societies. Oesch (2006), for example, argues that Goldthorpe’s class 
theory gives a too simplistic view on middle class, ignoring the important within-class 
variation in employment conditions. Savage et al. (2013) also point out that there are real 
cross-national differences with respect to how jobs are organised and the same category in 
Goldthorpe’s class classification might refer to different occupational realities between 
countries.      
A good class theory, as one would expect, should be indeed generic to a wide range of 
societies and not just applicable to one particular country. Evans and Mills’ multi-country 
validation studies of Goldthorpe’s class theory are a promising step forward. However, it still 
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remains questionable whether class is formed on a similar basis of employment structure in 
other societies, particularly outside Europe where significant variations in institutional 
arrangements in the labour market are expected to be found. The primary aim of this article is 
to assess the extent to which class can be approached from the employment relations 
perspective in such a country – China. 
 
 
The Chinese context 
 
China differs from the Western societies in political and economic institutions in a number of 
ways. First, despite thirty years’ reform, political power still holds a central position in 
China’s contemporary economic life. China is a transition economy, shifting from a centrally 
planned economy to a market oriented system. Before the transition, production and 
investment were solely organised by the State through central planning. Since 1978, China 
has undertaken a series of economic reforms and, as a result, the market has become a major 
force in shaping China’s economy (Tisdell, 2009). However, as Liu (2009) suggests, the 
Chinese Communist Party has never intended to clone a fully Westernised system; instead, 
they have aimed to build a ‘socialist market economy’, a defining characteristic of which is 
the predominance of political power in market activities. In contrast to the Western markets 
where the political intervention is minimised, various levels of Chinese government 
administration remain active players in the economy (Xie and Wu, 2008). On the one hand, 
they directly participate in the market activities through state owned enterprises (SOEs); on 
the other hand, the administrative power sets market entry rules, manages the private sector 
and provides unequal treatment between state and non-state divisions (Liu, 2009). 
The state owned sector therefore forms a unique driving force behind class formation in 
urban China. By 2006, the state sector represented 29.7 per cent of China’s total GDP and 
employed about 30 per cent of the urban labour force (Lee, 2009). Many SOEs have managed 
to prosper through their advantaged market position with enhanced abilities to reward its 
employees (Wu, 2013). More importantly, unlike private firms, most SOEs still see welfare 
provision, alongside revenue generation, as a fundamental function to fulfil. Xie et al. (2009) 
suggest that this is because the traditional dependency management-labour relationship has 
been largely retained in SOEs in which the management seeks cooperation from labour in 
production and the labour extracts recourses from management for wellbeing. SOEs 
redistribute a greater proportion of profit in the forms of bonuses and fringe benefits than do 
private firms to boost identity and harmony among employees (Xie and Wu, 2008). The state 
workers therefore often have access to a wider range of attractive benefits packages such as 
subsidised meals, children’s education fees and accommodation allowance, than their 
counterparts in the non-state sector (Xie and Wu, 2008; Xie et al., 2009; Wu, 2013).  
Another important factor that differentiates China from the Western societies is the legal 
system that regulates work and employment relations. In the planned economy, China did not 
have a labour market, all jobs being allocated through the planning system. The marketisation 
reforms started in the late 1907s but it was not until 1994 that China enacted its first national 
Labour Law. After two decades of development and practice, China’s labour market 
regulations still face many challenges, some of which have significant implications over 
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social stratification. A prominent issue is that workers are treated differently based on their 
household registration in the legal system. Due to their non-urban resident status, for example, 
migrant workers from the rural areas have had restricted employment opportunities in 
China’s cities and been excluded from the government’s labour policies for a long time 
(Ngok, 2008). Before 2008, China’s Labour Law did not even purport to include those 
workers under its protection (Li, 2008). Consequently, most migrant workers do not hold a 
labour contract with their employer and have very limited access to decent working 
conditions (Zhou, 2013). In contrast, local urban workers enjoy wider access to employment 
resources and are more likely to occupy jobs with better income, welfare and legal protection 
(Cooney, 2006). 
In addition to the discrimination against migrant workers, China’s legal regimes are also 
segmented across sectors. While state sector workers are better protected, those in the private 
sector, especially in small firms, are less likely to receive similar levels of legal protection 
(Ngok, 2008). This is also reflected in the contrasting proportions of workers who have 
signed labour contracts with their employers between the sectors. Whilst the labour contract 
system has been well implemented in the state sector, only about 13 per cent in the non-state 
sector have signed written contracts with their employers (Cheng et al., 2014). Although 
China’s new Labour Contract Law enacted in 2008 attempts to prohibit discrimination 
between different groups of workers or sectors and give equal rights to everyone in the labour 
market, the full social impact remains to be seen and the legal framework will continue to 
serve as an important source of social stratification in China in the foreseeable future. 
 
 
Data and method 
 
The data for analysis is taken from the 2006 China General Social Survey (CGSS). The 
CGSS is an annual or biannual survey designed to gather data on social trends and quality of 
life in China. A multi-stage stratified random sampling approach is used throughout the 
survey to ensure the representativeness of the data (for more information, see Bian and Li, 
2012). The 2006 CGSS surveyed 10151 respondents aged between 18 and 69 from rural and 
urban areas (except Tibet), with a response rate of 51.1 per cent. The employment module in 
the 2006 CGSS provides rich information on labour market activities and covers a wide range 
of topics on employment relations that are key to identifying class positions, making it an 
ideal data source for our investigation.  
The 2006 CGSS contains 3109 respondents from the urban areas and 3451 respondents 
from the rural areas who are currently in employment. Because the employment questions in 
the rural sample vary depending on the nature of respondents’ work activities and more 
importantly, some key questions (for example, the way salary is determined) are only asked 
in the urban sample, we restrict our estimating sample to full-time employees from urban 
areas. China’s current labour law defines full-time employment as work that exceeds 24 
hours per week and the legal working ages are 18 to 60 for men and 18 to 55 for women, 
respectively. Given this, only those respondents who satisfy those criteria are selected into 
our sample. In addition, we also exclude farm labour from urban areas which only compose 
less than 1 per cent of the sample. Applying these criteria leaves us with a sample of 2141 
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eligible respondents. Finally, after population weights are applied, our final estimating 
sample consists of 1522 observations.   
We use latent class analysis (LCA) to look for employee clusters that potentially reflect 
class positions. The analytical approach takes three steps. First, we use job characteristics that 
define class in Goldthorpe’s theoretical work as indicators in LCA and look for meaningful 
employee clusters as a means of measuring class. Examining these job characteristics will 
allow us to assess, based on the stereotypes of Goldthorpe’s classes, the extent to which class 
can be defined by employment relations in China. We then map these clusters onto the pre-
defined Goldthorpe’s class classification to examine how far these two groupings overlap 
with each other. Goldthorpe’s class classification is derived from the linkage between 
occupational structure and class positions based on the principles of the British labour market 
and if class positions are shaped by occupational structure in a similar way in China, we 
would expect to see a close correspondence between the two class variables – that is, people 
with similar occupations are clustered into same class positions and the pattern holds between 
the two societies. Finally, we compare the associations of income and benefits with the two 
class variables to assess the predictive power of Goldthorpe’s class for income inequality in 
urban China.  
    Previous research has identified two broad groups of job characteristics that define class 
positions. These include employment conditions and career prospects (Evans, 1992; Evans 
and Mills, 1998b, 1999). More recently, Goldthorpe (2007: ch. 5) suggests that employers’ 
intention to monitor employee performance and employees’ skills are the two driving forces 
behind class formation. We use all these four types of variables from the 2006 CGSS: 
 
1) Employment conditions:  
i. How are the respondent’s working hours arranged (WORKHR)? 
ii. Whether or not the respondent gets paid for overtime work (OVERTIMEPAY). 
iii. How is the respondent’s monthly salary determined (SALARY)? 
 
2) Career prospects: 
i. How likely is it for the respondent to be promoted within the organisation in the 
coming years (PROM)? 
 
3) Employer monitoring: 
i. How frequent does the respondent’s line manager check the progress or quality of 
their work (MONIT)? 
   
4) Employee skills: 
i. How long does it take for the respondent to learn the skills to do the current job 
well (SKILL)?  
 
    The 2006 CGSS contains respondents’ occupational information coded into the 1988 
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88). We use this information to 
construct the pre-defined Goldthorpe’s class classification (Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1996). 
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After excluding self-employed (IV) and farm labour (VIIb), the final Goldthorpe class 
variable in our sample contains the following seven categories: 
 
I:  Higher-grade professionals, administrators, and officials; managers in large industrial 
establishments 
II:  Lower-grade professionals, administrators, and officials, higher-grade technicians; 
managers in small industrial establishments; supervisors of non-manual employees 
IIIa:  Routine non-manual, higher grade 
IIIb:  Routine non-manual, lower grade 
V:  Lower-grade technicians; supervisors of manual workers 
VI:  Skilled workers 
VIIa:  Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers 
 
Finally, class is one of the most important sources of income inequality in social life 
(Erikson and Goldthorpe 2010; Weeden et al. 2007). As such, we would expect to see a 
theoretically meaningful association between the two variables. In addition to income, 
employee benefits represent important aspects of extrinsic job rewards and can vary across 
sectors in China (Wu, 2013). In the survey, respondents are asked to indicate whether their 
employer provide with them the following benefits: 1) free medical care, 2) basic health 
insurance, 3) complementary health insurance, 4) basic pension, 5) complementary pension, 
6) unemployment insurance and 7) housing allowance. We use these variables to test their 
association with class as well. Income and benefits are coded as follows: 
 
1) Monthly income (RMB): 499 or less, 500–999, 1000–1499, 1500–1999, 2000–2499, 
2500–2999, 3000–3999, 4000–4999, 5000 or more (INCOME). 
2) Number of benefits: No benefits, 1–2, 3–4, 5 or more (BENEFIT).  
 
    In Table 2, we present the indicators and outcome variables, together with the Goldthrope 
class classification. Examination of the table, however, reveals that some of the indicators 
have a large number of response categories and this leads to the concern about the reliability 
of the LCA model fit statistics as a guide in model selection. This is because the χ2 and G2 fit 
statistics do not follow the theoretical chi square distribution when the data is highly sparse. 
In our data, there are 1522 observations whereas the contingency table contains 4608 cells. In 
order to reduce the number of cells, we recode WORKHR into a dichotomy, distinguishing 
between ‘completely fixed with no flexibility’ and the other two responses indicating ‘some’ 
or ‘complete’ flexibility. We also collapse PROM into two categories by combining ‘Very 
likely’ with ‘Likely’ and ‘Unlikely’ with ‘Very unlikely’. Finally, we pair up the responses 
and convert the eight-category MONIT and SKILL into two four-category indicators. After 
the collapsing, we managed to reduce the 4608 cells to only 384 cells with 1522 observations.    
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
 
Results 
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We start with the independence model assuming all indicators are independent, followed by 
three further models in which the presence of two, three and four latent classes is assumed 
respectively to account for the associations among the observed indicators. Table 3 reports 
the fit statistics of these LCA models. As we can see, the χ2 and G2 values suggest that both 
three-class and four-class solutions fit the data well. Based on the principle of parsimony, the 
three-class model is selected for further analysis.    
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
    Table 4 summarises latent class probabilities and item probabilities conditional upon class 
membership for the three-class model. Although not perfectly neat, this LCA model does 
seem to capture some cross-class variations in job attributes that correspond well to 
Goldthorpe’s theoretical thinking on class classifications. Latent class 1, about 8 per cent of 
the sample, is composed of respondents whose jobs are more of the service contract nature 
whereas respondents in latent class 3, roughly half of the total sample, appear to have the 
labour contract type of jobs. The remaining latent class 2, about 41 per cent, is somewhere in 
between, singling out respondents from the intermediate class positions. 
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
    A close look at the conditional probabilities across the six indicators reveals the following 
patterns. An overwhelming proportion of respondents in Class 1 have total or partial flexible 
working hour arrangements (WORKHR) and a similar proportion claim that they receive no 
pay for overtime work (OVERTIMEPAY). Their monthly salary (SALARY) is least related to 
the amount of work or job performance. They have some opportunities to be promoted within 
the organisation (PROM) in the coming years but the likelihood is not too high. They seem to 
enjoy the greatest work autonomy (MONIT) among the three classes – about four fifths of 
them report that their line managers would check their work quarterly or less frequently. 
Moreover, the majority of respondents in Class 1 take more than one month, with over a third 
over a year, to learn necessary skills (SKILL) to do the job well. Class 3, on the other end of 
the spectrum, have the opposite response patterns. About two thirds of them have no 
flexibility in working hours at all. They tend to receive pay for overtime work and their salary 
is more directly related to work load or immediate job performance. Nearly none of them 
have a promising promotion prospect. Their work is closely monitored and does not require 
much skill. Finally, Class 2 is somewhat intermediately positioned with most their responses 
taking the middle point between those two classes above.             
    These patterns fit into Goldthorpe’s class stereotypes rather well. However, there are also 
some unexpected patterns in Table 4. Class 2, the intermediate class, for example, has a 
higher proportion of members that receive pay for overtime work than Class 3, the labour 
contract class. At the first glance, it is also counter intuitive that respondents in Class 1, the 
service class, have poorer career advancement prospects than their intermediate counterparts. 
Finally, the ‘learning time to do job well’ question receives polarised answers from the 
service class respondents. Although one third of them suggest they need at least one year, 
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about the same proportion claim they only need a few days or less to learn the skills which is 
very similar to that of labour contract class respondents.  
    Some further thoughts and investigations suggest these findings might not be totally 
surprising. Firstly, working overtime is extensively regulated by the labour law in China. 
Workers with standard working hour arrangements are entitled to overtime pay if they work 
extra hours. Inspection of the data reveals that over two thirds of the respondents in Class 3 
do not hold an employment contract with their employer, the highest among the three classes 
and further analysis shows they are nearly three times more likely to receive no pay for 
overtime work than those with an employment contract. It appears that, therefore, the lower 
than expected ratio of overtime pay in Class 3 is probably due to the lack of labour protection 
for those working class workers.  
    Regarding promotion prospects, one explanation for the fact that the intermediate class 
respondents are better off than their service class counterparts is that these two groups of 
employees are at different career stages. While the latter is already relatively advanced, the 
former expect more room for further development.2 This is consistent with what Evans and 
Mills (1998b) have found in their British study. A similar logic can be applied to the 
polarised responses to the ‘learning time’ question for the service class respondents in Class 
1. While it is reasonable to assume that service class jobs typically involve long and complex 
processes of training, the learning curve would be less steep for those experienced 
employees. To test this, we examined the respondents’ experience before the current job and 
indeed we found a negative relationship between experience and learning time spent at work. 
    We now turn to assessing whether class can be defined in the same way by employment 
relationships between urban China and the Western societies. To achieve that, we add the 
pre-defined Goldthorpe class classification as a seventh indicator to the three-class LCA 
model. If the way employment relations shape class formation is consistent between urban 
China and Britain, we would expect to see the seven-category classification variable 
collapses neatly into the three latent type classes.3 The results of this exercise are summarised 
in Table 5. We can see that the pre-defined Goldthorpe classes I and II map quite nicely onto 
latent class 1, the service class. Around 90 per cent of members of these two Goldthorpe 
classes are classified into Class 1, representing 75 per cent of the total population of that 
latent class. A similar degree of matching can be found between the two Goldthorpe working 
classes and latent class 3, the labour contract class. There are 90 per cent and 66 per cent of 
VI and VIIa falling into Class 3 respectively and they make up in total 89 per cent of the 
Class 3 population. The match between IIIab and latent classes is less good but still decent. 
For IIIa, there is an even split, around 45 per cent each, between latent classes 1 and 2, 
forming 11 per cent and 17 per cent of these two classes respectively. IIIb can be comfortably 
linked to latent class 2. About 81 per cent of IIIb can be found in Class 2 exclusively and the 
former constitutes over half of the latter. Finally, Table 5 suggests that Goldthorpe class V 
corresponds to latent class 1. An overwhelming proportion, roughly 88 per cent, of V belong 
to class 1, and they compose 6 per cent of the Class 1 population.        
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
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The results show that there is a decent degree of correspondence between the pre-defined 
Goldthorpe class classification and the latent classes identified by LCA. This suggests that 
class and occupations are linked in a similar way between urban China and the West. 
Goldthorpe classes I/II and VI/VIIa occupy two ends (i.e., the service class and the labour 
contract class) of the class structure, while IIIb, together with a significant proportion of IIIa, 
compose the main body of the intermediate class. The finding that Goldthorpe class V almost 
exclusively belongs to latent class 1 seems somehow unexpected. Class V normally holds an 
intermediate status in the class system, containing some elements of both service and labour 
contract classes (Breen, 2005; Goldthorpe, 2007: ch. 5). It has empirically loaded onto the 
latent classes that reflect intermediate and labour contract class positions in previous 
validation studies (Evans and Mills, 1999, 2000). However, this is not totally surprising. 
Evans and Mills (1998b), for instance, find that the Goldthorpe classes V and II are not easily 
distinguishable with, the only obvious difference between the two being supervisory status – 
class V members are supervisors of manual workers whereas class I/II members supervise 
non-manual workers. Therefore, the convergence of I/II and V in our analysis seems to chime 
with Evans and Mills’ finding and suggests that individuals in supervisory positions, 
regardless the type of subordinates they have, share similar class positions in urban China.  
    A final task of the investigation is to assess, more from the explanatory power perspective, 
how far Goldthorpe’s class as an analytical concept can capture inter-class income inequality 
in urban China. To that end, we use a similar approach, namely, adding a seventh indicator, 
this time monthly income, to the three-class LCA model. Examining the association between 
income and the LCA class variable will reveal the effectiveness of Goldthorpe’s class 
concept in capturing income inequality. In addition, we also check how income is associated 
with the pre-defined Goldthorpe class classification to assess the construct validity of this 
class measure. Considering that employee benefits also have monetary values and reflect 
significant aspects of job rewards in some sectors, particularly the state sector, we further 
examine the associations between benefits and the two class measures in explaining income 
inequality in the Chinese context. As class V controversially falls into the service class in the 
LCA models and only composes about 3 per cent of the total sample, we exclude this class 
from further analysis. In order to make the two class measures comparable, we collapse the 
Goldthorpe classification into a three-category class variable which contains the following 
categories: 1) I/II: Service, 2) IIIab: Routine non-manual and 3) VI/VIIa: Manual workers. 
The associations of the income and benefits with the two class measures are reported in 
Figure 1 and Table 6.    
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
In Figure 1, we can see that three latent classes have an apparent association with income. 
There is clear discrimination between these classes and the pattern makes perfect sense – the 
service class, Class 1, has the highest income whereas the labour contract class, Class 3, has 
the lowest. The intermediate class, Class 2, stands somewhere in between. This pattern, 
however, does not hold for the Goldthorpe classification, where only two distinctive groups 
can be identified. As can be seen, the pre-defined Goldthorpe classes I/II remain the best paid 
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group. But the other two groups, classes IIIab and VI/VIIa, almost completely overlap with 
each other.  
 
TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Table 6 summarises the probability workers receive different number of benefits 
depending on their class membership. The pattern identified by LCA suggests the service and 
intermediate classes are on similar levels of benefits, with the latter slightly better, and the 
labour contract class is the worst among the three classes. While it is foreseeable that the 
labour contract class has minimum benefits, the intermediate class having better packages 
than the service class is a bit unexpected. Further analysis suggests that this is probably 
caused by the fact that there are about one third more respondents from the state sector in the 
intermediate class than those in the service class and welfare distribution is still an important 
function of SOEs in post-reform China (Xie and Wu, 2008). In the Goldthorpe class 
classification, I/II get the most benefits, followed by VI/VIIa and IIIab. The difference 
between VI/VIIa and IIIab is also counter-intuitive, but we again find VI/VIIa has more 
respondents from the state sector than does IIIab, which might be able to account for the 
unexpected pattern between the two classes. 
Based on Figure 1 and Table 6 we can see that LCA has identified an apparent pattern 
across the three classes. The service class enjoys the highest income and is on relatively good 
benefits. They are clearly the winner. The intermediate class has middle-level income and 
also good benefits. The labour contract class has the lowest income as well as the least 
benefits and is therefore at the bottom of the hierarchical structure. The Goldthorpe class 
classification, compared to the LCA classes, has also found to be associated with income and 
benefits but much less theoretically meaningful – whilst those in the managerial and 
professional positions have the best overall packages, manual workers are better off than the 
routine non-manuals. This shows that although the LCA class measure captures inter-class 
income inequality quite nicely, the Goldthorpe class classification only singles out the service 
contract type but fails to detect the intermediate-labour contract differential in the Chinese 
context.     
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This article has aimed to address the issue of whether class can be understood from the 
employment relations perspective suggested by Goldthorpe’s class theory in contemporary 
urban China. Specifically, it has investigated three empirical questions about whether class 
can be defined by employment relations, how occupational structure shapes class positions, 
and the explanatory power of class for income inequality in the Chinese context. Class has 
been conceptualised and theorised in industrialised societies and addressing these issues in a 
context where the labour market institutions significantly vary from those in the West thus 
casts new light on the generality of this influential theory.  
    Using six job attributes of direct theoretical relevance to Goldthorpe’s class 
conceptualisation, the analysis has identified three employee clusters in urban China through 
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LCA. Among these, two clusters occupy the two ends of the spectrum and have a close 
correspondence to the service and labour contract classes in Goldthorpe’s theoretical 
writings. The third cluster has some mixed characteristics of the two polar classes which fits 
into the Goldthorpe intermediate class stereotype well. These results suggest that, similar to 
those in industrialised societies, class positions can also be defined by employment relations 
in contemporary urban China. When mapped onto the Goldthorpe class classification, a 
reasonable degree of overlap has been found between these employee clusters and the 
corresponding Goldthorpe classes, suggesting the way class is linked to occupational 
structure is quite similar between China and the West. Finally, this class concept has 
displayed some explanatory power for income inequality in China. This is particularly 
evident for the LCA class measure that differentiates clear patterns across class positions. 
    The analysis has also yielded some unexpected findings such as counterintuitive 
distributions on some indicators across classes, unsatisfactory correspondence between some 
Goldthorpe and latent classes as well as the blurred association of the Goldthorpe class 
classification with income. Although some may be explained by specific Chinese labour 
market conditions, some unexpected findings could also be caused by the recoded indicators 
in the LCA. Despite being an effective solution to the sparse data problem, collapsing 
response categories in indicators inevitably leads to some information loss which may mask 
some distinctive class patterns. More nuanced position may emerge if large samples are 
available. The mismatch between the LCA and Goldthorpe classes and the poor explanatory 
power of the Goldthorpe class classification for non-services class income inequality, 
however, do seem to point to some fundamental issues about the validity of this class concept 
in the Chinese context.  
The first issue concerns where the Goldthorpe class V should be placed in the class 
structure. Class V is normally seen to have the intermediate status in theoretical discussions 
but it has been suggested that V may be indistinguishable from one of the service contract 
classes, II, without the information on supervisory status (Evans and Mills, 1998b). This is 
consistent with what we have found – an overwhelming proportion of class V members in our 
sample hold the same service type of labour contract as the I/II class members do. Secondly, 
our analysis has shown that the service-intermediate contract type boundary cuts through 
class IIIa instead of between II and IIIa as the class theory has suggested. This suggests that, 
in contrast to Britain where the service class is potentially inflated by the Goldthorpoe class 
classification (Evans and Mills, 2000), the classification tends to underestimate the size of the 
service class in urban China. Finally, the Goldthorpe classification, as an operationalisation 
of the class concept, seems to lack predictive power for income differentiation between 
intermediate and labour contract classes. Although class boundaries should not be drawn so 
as to maximise the predictive power of outcome variables (Evans and Mills, 2000), the fact 
that the LCA class measure does display some theoretically meaningful associations with 
income and benefits inevitably raises the question of whether an amendment of the 
Goldthorpe class classification is needed to better capture inter-class income inequality, 
especially between the intermediate and labour contract classes, in the Chinese context. After 
all, it is unlikely that the job titles based on the British labour market will completely mirror 
the employment relations in China.  
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When used in the Chinese context, Goldthorpe’s class theory is often criticised for 
overlooking the role of non-market institutions, such as political power, legal norms or 
household registration system, in social stratification. Indeed we have found some evidence 
that these factors still, to varying degree, influence how resources are distributed in the 
Chinese labour market. As we have shown, many of our unexpected findings can be 
accounted for by these factors. Although developing a better class measure in China goes 
beyond the scope of this article, incorporating these variables into the analytical framework 
of China’s stratification deserves further exploration. There are several new Chinese class 
schemas taking into account both market and non-market factors and initial validation studies 
on these schemas look rather encouraging (see Lin and Wu, 2009; Liu, 2009). 
In the long run, however, we would expect to see China departs increasingly from the class 
structure driven by political forces and moves towards a market-based stratification system 
outlined in Goldthorpe’s class theory. With marketisation deepening, the employment share 
of the state sector keeps declining, leading to less income inequality in China’s urban areas 
(Xia et al., 2014). In 2008, China’s first Anti-Monopoly Law came into force which intends 
to protect competition and provide a level playing field for all market players. Although still 
supporting certain SOEs in some strategic sectors, the law prohibits the SOEs from abusing 
their market position to compete with private firms. The latest Labour Contract Law was also 
enacted in 2008, aiming to treat everyone equally under the same legal framework. All these 
institutional changes suggest that a more open and market-oriented labour market is emerging 
in China.    
    In conclusion, the evidence revealed by this study has shown that despite the different 
economic and political institutions, class can be defined in a very similar way from the 
employment relationship perspective, as it is in Western societies, in urban China. This not 
only adds new evidence to the generality of the class theory but also validates its application 
in less developed or market-oriented economies. Although the principles that regulate 
employment relations in industrialised countries will not perfectly reflect the reward systems 
in less developed labour markets, Goldthorpe’s class theory has laid a promising foundation 
on which a better understanding of the stratification in the Chinese society can be achieved.    
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Notes
 
1 This is also known as the EGP class schema. 
 
2 Class 1 contains a much larger proportion of respondents than the other two classes who 
replied ‘Not applicable’ to the promotion question.  
 
3 This model returns a χ2 of 9898.23 and a G2 of 3657.83 with 1469 degrees of freedom. The 
lack of model fit is due to the sparseness of the data after including the class variable. In 
order to test the fit of this model, we collapsed the Goldthorpe class classification into three 
categories corresponding to the LCA classes and added it as the new indicator. This model 
returned a satisfactory model fit.  
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Table 1    The Goldthorpe class classification 
Contract type Goldthorpe class 
Service 
contract1 
I Higher-grade professionals, administrators, and officials; 
managers in large industrial establishments 
II Lower-grade professionals, administrators, and officials, higher-
grade technicians; managers in small industrial establishments; 
supervisors of non-manual employees 
Intermediate 
contract2 
IIIa Routine non-manual, higher grade 
IIIb Routine non-manual, lower grade  
IV Small employers and self-employed 
V Lower-grade technicians; supervisors of manual workers 
Labour 
contract 
VI Skilled manual workers 
VIIa Semi-skilled/unskilled manual workers 
VIIb Agricultural/other workers in primary production 
Notes: 
1. Excludes large employers 
2. Excludes small employers and self-employed. 
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Table 2    Indicators, Goldthorpe classes and outcome variables 
Indicator     Response Proportion 
WORKHR a Not at all fixed with complete flexibility 0.11 
(n=1522) a Basically fixed with some flexibility 0.33 
  Completely fixed with no flexibility 0.56 
   
OVERTIMEPAY  Yes 0.56 
(n=1471)  No 0.44 
   
SALARY  Directly related to amount of work or performance 0.40 
(n=1418)  Partially related to amount of work or performance  0.19 
  Not at all related to amount of work or performance 0.41 
   
PROM a Very likely 0.02 
(n=1252) a Likely 0.26 
 b Unlikely 0.34 
 b Very unlikely 0.39 
   
MONIT a Never 0.08 
(n=1480) a Annually or quarterly 0.12 
 b Monthly 0.13 
 b Once every half month 0.05 
 c Weekly 0.11 
 c A few times a week 0.12 
 d Almost daily 0.29 
 d Under direct supervision 0.10 
   
SKILL a One day 0.16 
(n=1522) a A few days 0.11 
 b About one week 0.12 
 b Nearly one month 0.11 
 c One to three months 0.17 
 c Over three months but less than one year 0.11 
 d Over one year 0.10 
 d Over three years 0.12 
   
Goldthorpe class  I: Upper service 0.14 
(n=1522)  II: Lower service 0.21 
  IIIa: Routine non-manual, higher grade 0.11 
  IIIb: Routine non-manual, lower grade 0.18 
  V: Manual supervisors and technicians 0.03 
  VI: Skilled manual workers 0.18 
  VIIa: Semi- and unskilled manual workers 0.17 
   
INCOME  499 or less 0.10 
(n=1429)  500–999 0.32 
  1000–1499 0.27 
  1500–1999 0.12 
  2000–2499 0.09 
  2500–2999 0.02 
  3000–3999 0.04 
  4000–4999 0.01 
  5000 or more 0.02 
   
BENEFIT  No benefits 0.35 
(n=1294)  1–2 0.17 
  3–4 0.22 
  5 or more 0.26 
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Table 3    Fit statistics for LCA models 
Model χ2 p. G2 p. d.f. 
Independence 1656.61 0.00 1280.43 0.95 1367 
2 classes 1497.37 0.00 1173.20 1.00 1355 
3 classes 1414.33 0.09 1118.26 1.00 1343 
4 classes 1335.47 0.46 1064.40 1.00 1331 
 
 
 
 
Table 4    Class probabilities and item conditional probabilities for 3 class LCA model 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
Class probabilities 0.08 0.41 0.51 
    
Conditional probabilities    
WORKHR    
  Complete/Partial flexibility 0.84 0.47 0.35 
  No flexibility 0.16 0.53 0.65 
    
OVERTIMEPAY    
  Yes 0.20 0.68 0.51 
  No 0.80 0.32 0.49 
    
SALARY    
  Directly related to amount of work or performance 0.34 0.39 0.41 
  Partially related to amount of work or performance  0.08 0.31 0.11 
  Not at all related to amount of work or performance 0.57 0.29 0.48 
    
PROM    
  Likely/Very likely 0.17 0.54 0.06 
  Unlikely/Very unlikely 0.83 0.46 0.94 
    
MONIT    
  Never/Quarterly or annually 0.81 0.18 0.13 
  Once every half month/Monthly 0.12 0.23 0.15 
  A few times a week/Weekly 0.02 0.30 0.21 
  Daily/Under direct supervision 0.05 0.29 0.51 
    
SKILL    
  One day/A few days 0.35 0.12 0.37 
  About one week/Nearly one month 0.09 0.23 0.25 
  One to three months/Over three months but less than one year 0.21 0.33 0.26 
  Over one year/Over three years 0.36 0.32 0.11 
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Table 5    Estimated two way margins of 3 class LCA models by Goldthorpe class 
classification 
  LCA 
  Column proportions  Row proportions 
  Class 1 Class 2 Class 3  Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
Goldthorpe class I 0.91 0.08 0.00  0.30 0.04 0.00 
 II 0.90 0.09 0.01  0.45 0.07 0.01 
 IIIa 0.45 0.45 0.10  0.11 0.17 0.03 
 IIIb 0.09 0.81 0.11  0.04 0.52 0.06 
 V 0.88 0.00 0.12  0.06 0.00 0.01 
 VI 0.10 0.00 0.90  0.04 0.00 0.53 
 VIIa 0.02 0.33 0.66  0.01 0.20 0.36 
 
 
Table 6    Estimated benefits by 3 class LCA model and Goldthorpe class classification 
 LCA  Goldthorpe class 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3  I/II IIIab VI/VIIa 
No benefits 0.28 0.19 0.54  0.16 0.37 0.26 
1–2 0.16 0.21 0.15  0.16 0.15 0.17 
3–4 0.24 0.26 0.17  0.27 0.22 0.27 
5 or more 0.32 0.34 0.15  0.41 0.27 0.30 
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Figure 1    Estimated monthly income by latent class and Goldthorpe class classification 
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